Archive for December, 2009
December 18th, 2009 by Justin
Continued from yesterday’s post…
Conclusions and Recommendations
American policymakers would be wise to heed the lessons of history. Although Muhammad Zahir Shah reigned over a stable central Afghan state for 40 years, the period was marked by limited progress for the country as a whole, and the central government depended so heavily on the support and cooperation of the regions that as soon as they became disenchanted with the liberalizing reforms of the 1970s, they withdrew support and allowed the central state to fall.
Above all, the concept of a single Afghan identity was never fully embraced by the vast majority of people. The US currently is seeking to build a state without a nation underlying it. This strategy of course worked for the original European states in the early modern period, given their wide discretion in the areas of violence, propaganda and culture (essential for cultivating a national identity) and economic capital. Today the Afghanistan government has little to no power over these areas of society, and can barely even project its authority to the regions, much less use that authority.
The proper approach for the US and its allies in Afghanistan is to work to build state structures on the regional level where they are likely to be most effective and enjoy greatest legitimacy and support from the people. The regional and tribal entities have demonstrated for over 200 years their status as the ultimate political authorities in Afghanistan, and have shown a superior ability to make good on the claim to monopolize violence and win the legitimacy and loyalty of their people. They have shown that they are the ultimate source of autonomy and sovereignty, not a contrived and distant government dependent on a foreign sugar daddy. Finally, they have enjoyed and continue to enjoy integration with the larger society, derived as they are from the local social and cultural system.
The United States must work to strengthen, modernize, formalize, depersonalize and bureaucratize these smaller-scale political entities—perhaps within the context of a weak federal system that has limited authority over economic and foreign policy matters—and move them in the direction of popular rule. Such a project will not be easy, but in any case it will be inordinately easier and cheaper than the current strategy. That is because the hardest part, in many ways—gaining sustainable legitimacy and loyalty from a community of people who have a common identity—is already done.
The US can either try to force a new identity to the fore, or just work with the ones already in place. The choice, it would seem, has been made for us. Did Obama get the memo?
Sources
Poggi, Gianfranco. The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects. Stanford University Press, 1990.
Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. 2nd ed. Yale University Press, 2002.
Tilly, Charles. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.”
***
This ends the main portion of the article, adapted from a paper I wrote earlier this year. Tomorrow I will post some final thoughts.
Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4
December 17th, 2009 by Justin
Continuing from yesterday’s post…
Afghanistan: A Tough Nut to Crack
However, there are deeper structural impediments standing in the way of a modern Afghan state. From the rulers of the 18th century to the Taliban in the 1990s, certain characteristics of Afghanistan have continually thwarted the efforts of centralizing forces. Like Europe, whose rivers, mountain ranges and peninsulas ensured that small regional political entities came to dominate in their respective areas, Afghanistan’s physical terrain has proven a massive impediment to the rise of a single, centralized state capable of projecting its power across the entire land. In geographical terms, Afghanistan is divided up by mountain ranges and rivers rendering it difficult to traverse (and therefore difficult to bring under a central authority structure), and facilitating the development of regional identities and local particularities.
Afghanistan today has between 25 and 40 ethnic groups (depending on what is counted), each with their own language and cultural niceties. By contrast, the typical modern state in the developed world (that is, those that have become most successful in terms of security and prosperity) contains at most two or three major languages and one dominant ethnic group and one culture. It is this high degree of homogeneity—even greater in earlier periods in those countries—that facilitates the development of a strong single national identity, which in turn becomes vital to the long term legitimacy and sustainability of the state. Thus, the geography of Afghanistan, like that of Europe itself, deters the development of a single national identity as well as the development of a single central state authority.
While most in the international community would think it unwise to try to build a single state to rule all of Western Europe, for example, it deems it acceptable to do so in Afghanistan with an identity of equivalent salience to “Western European.” The relatively large number of ethnic and cultural groups in Afghanistan, rather than being thought of as “subnational” identities, must be seen as the true “nations” of that place. Given that these identities—Pashtun, Tajik, Hazar, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and others—are more salient, and enjoy primacy over the “Afghan” identity for so many people, whatever the traditional western perspective is, they must be seen as the actual national identities for the inhabitants. Understanding the true nature of identity in Afghanistan elucidates a major reason why state-builders have consistently failed to construct a single long-lasting Afghanistan state over the last 200 years.
Afghanistan’s History of Attempts at State Building
Since the 18th century, when the idea emerged of an independent and centralized Afghanistan united under a single leader, the country has seesawed between centralization and decentralization, between statist and chiefdom and tribal forms of political organization, and between depersonalized bureaucracy and personalistic power.
The first major attempt at state building that had any measure of success was that of Abdul Rahman, the “Iron Emir,” in the late 19th century, under whom the first Afghani military and system of taxation were created. His plan to unite the tribes through personal ties and subsequently create a formal bureaucracy and institutional structure died with him, because it was largely his personal presence that underlay the entire system. The elites in the new proto-state structure did develop a sense of a common Afghan identity, but this failed to trickle down to the average people.
Afghanistan’s next major leader, Muhammad Zahir Shah (reigned 1933-1973), also made attempts at modernization, including in social areas such as education, healthcare and women’s rights. Ultimately, though, like Abdul Rahman, Muhammad Zahir successfully ruled only with the approval of the regional and tribal authorities on the one side, and with a foreign power supplying money and arms on the other (Abdul had the British Empire, Muhammad, the Soviet Union). The state therefore had a quick death upon Muhammad’s overthrow, with regional powers seizing infrastructure and other resources, and withdrawing support from the central government, prompting the Soviet invasion in 1979.
To be continued…
Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4
December 16th, 2009 by Justin
For the next few days, I will write an extended article on the proper way forward in Afghanistan, and the historical and sociopolitical reasoning behind it. It is adapted from a paper I wrote earlier this year, and will come in the form of several posts. It is a bit academic, and some basic knowledge of Afghan and European history will help the reader, but rest assured it is very accessible. Following is Part 1, dealing with the basic features of the thing we call “the state,” its history and what it means for Afghanistan.
State Building in Afghanistan
The United States is attempting to build a sustainable modern state in a country that has never known one, and that has frustrated repeated attempts thereof. In order to understand why the current effort in Afghanistan is wrongheaded and doomed to fail, as well as the proper approach the US should be taking, it is necessary to appreciate the key elements of successful modern state building and the history of attempts at state building in that country.
The history of the state in general, and of Afghanistan in particular, indicate that any effort to build a fully-functional state would require vast amounts of material and human resources above and beyond the current American commitment. There is, however, an easier and cheaper way to cultivate stability and peace, one that builds legitimate authority from already established regional and tribal political systems. But it requires a fundamental overhaul of the American and western mindset vis-à-vis Afghanistan.
Key elements of a sustainable state
According to Weber, a state is an organization that (1) is the ultimate political authority in a given area, (2) has authority over a bounded territory with defined borders, (3) makes a claim to monopolize the use of violence on that territory, and (4) that claim is legitimate for the people of that territory. Poggi identifies four further characteristics: differentiation from other organizations; autonomy or sovereignty; centralization; and formal coordination among its divisions.
In addition to these features, three processes that have characterized the development of the modern state are: (a) the depersonalization of political power, (b) the formalization of the exercise of political power, and (c) the integration of political power into a greater social whole.
The state requires both despotic (or decision-making) power and infrastructural (or decision-implementing) power in order to function, and to realize its exclusive claim to the legitimate use of violence. These forms of power, in turn, rest upon concentrated sovereignty and centralized territory, respectively.
The Birth of the Modern State
Accordingly, in the late middle ages and early modern era, those European governments that succeeded in centralizing sovereignty and territory were those that led the way in state-building. By the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, the secular state had triumphed over the church in terms of the legitimacy for rule, thereby uniting political and moral authority in the single institution of the state. In addition, the territorially contiguous political community with centralized sovereignty arose as the best option for organizing, increasing and managing both capital and coercion (i.e. wealth and violence).
With their new and expanding despotic and infrastructural power, European states over the next several hundred years consolidated their monopoly on physical violence, along with legitimacy in the eyes of subjects. Legitimacy was consolidated indefinitely with the cultivation of a national identity and the merging of the state with the nation in the nation-state.
Given that the most important characteristic of the state is its monopoly on violence, the most important element that characterized the rise of the state in Europe was coercion—including everything from war with foreign invaders to police action against petty criminals. Charles Tilly takes the central place of coercion a step further: “to the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket.”
Ultimately, if one places all instances of violence somewhere on the same continuum, as Tilly does, then the process of state-making is a process of organized crime in another guise, and the distinction between state violence and other forms of violence is simply that “the personnel of states purveyed violence on a larger scale, more effectively, more efficiently, with wider assent from their subject populations, and with readier collaboration from neighboring authorities than did the personnel of other organizations.” In the same way, it follows that the most successful states have been able to use this power more intelligently and with greater legitimacy from their populations than less successful states.
Structural Problems with Building an Afghan State
A cursory look at modern Afghanistan reveals glaring deficiencies on the aforementioned aspects of state structure. Problems arise with the third and fourth of Weber’s qualities, and with all of Poggi’s three major processes. Regarding Weber’s third factor, the current government makes a claim to monopolize violence, but is clearly incapable of making good on that claim, hence the chaos and violence in so much of the country. On the fourth factor, legitimacy in the eyes of the people, the central government is quite weak. This is of course related to its inability to project its influence and guarantee security, but stems ultimately from the fact that huge segments of the Afghan population simply do not identify with a single Afghanistan-wide identity, nor with a government claiming to act on behalf of such a community.
As for Poggi’s three processes, neither depersonalization, formalization, nor integration characterize the central Afghan “state.” Political power remains strongly tied to personal loyalties and relationships, as it always has in that country. It therefore maintains a largely informal character. (Afghanistan is considered the most corrupt country on the planet.) And political power is certainly integrated into a greater social whole, but only on the regional and tribal level, while the central state occupies a place mostly removed from the lives of Afghans outside of the capital.
The centrality of violence and war in the original process of state-building poses a special problem for the construction of a modern Afghanistan state. As already mentioned, the current government is incapable of enforcing its claim to a monopoly on violence. Perhaps even more importantly, whereas war was a much more “acceptable” option during the late middle ages, and well into the modern era, today it is eschewed and looked upon as a last resort by any government seeking legitimacy and by any serious decision-maker. Regardless of whether this is a positive or negative development overall (I believe it is positive), it is unquestionably negative as far as the consolidation of an Afghanistan state is concerned. Rather than aggressively seeking total control over their populations whatever the human costs, as the earliest European states often did, modern states are much more limited when it comes to the use of force. The prime tool used by the original modern states—war—is basically off the table.
To be continued…
Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4
December 15th, 2009 by Justin
Image from a new infrared telescope. Beat that, “Lord of the Israelites.”
More in Wired magazine.
December 14th, 2009 by Justin
Fareed Zakaria writes recently in Newsweek that maybe the economic situation is not so bad after all. The financial system has calmed down and government intervention has helped with economic stability over the last year.
Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.
This triumphalist tone is easy enough to neutralize. For example, Dan Agin (who is not even an economist—although that is probably a good thing) in the Huffington Post wrote in November that
The reality is that since our Great Recession is only a year old, it may be silly to interpret every upward blip as a sign that it’s almost finished…What was the situation, the mood, and the prognosis in 1930, during the year following the Great Crash? In 1930, the population of the United States was 122 million, and evidently hardly anyone in the country understood the hardships that lay ahead of them. Certainly, American culture and innovation were booming… Early in the year, a minor bull market drove up stock prices of U.S. Steel, General Motors, and General Electric, which led to a wave of optimism among political and business leaders. (Sound familiar?)… The unemployment figure was 4.5 million and slowly rising…
Turns out that “things look [something] like they did in the 1930s,” Fareed. Many people seem incapable of taking a longer-term view of things, of understanding short term, month-to-month developments in the context of the larger, year-to-year processes that are unfolding. This is unfortunate.
Do Changes in the Global Order Render History Moot?
More importantly, though, Zakaria notes three major changes in the global order today that render analogies between this historical moment and the Great Depression illegitimate:
The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world’s major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations.
But the same could be said on the eve of World War I! Obviously, there is no conflict in the world… until there is. The Cold War ended in about 1990. So it has been 20 years. That is a very long time from the standpoint of a single human life, but inconsequential in the scheme of history. First of all, during these 20 years there have been plenty of wars, battles, campaigns and skirmishes, and they have indeed involved the major powers, even if those powers have not engaged each other directly. Second of all, what does Zakaria make of the rising tensions of various kinds involving Iran, Russia, China and the United States? Finally, remember that 20 years was also the stretch of time between the two World Wars. On the eve of World War II, one could have easily made the same exact statement about global stability and great power peace. What else has Zakaria got?
The second force for stability is the victory—after a decades-long struggle—over the cancer of inflation. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs and wages that you might have had in the future, inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your savings. In many countries in the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for many of the political dramas of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran.
Like conflict, inflation was never a problem before… until it was. There is nothing inherently unique about our current historical moment when it comes to inflation. Yes, effective monetary policy has helped keep inflation down. But this is by no means a structural phenomenon that is baked into the economic system, and therefore a change of fiscal or monetary policy, or in macroeconomic conditions, in one or more countries may very well change the behavior of prices over both the short and long term.
Furthermore, recent inflation rates in the US are not meaningfully different from inflation rates decades ago. See the chart below, from Inflationdata.com. Yes, there was an uptick in the 1970s and 1980s, but how does Zakaria’s inflation argument square with the fact that average inflation over the last 20 years is entirely comparable to that during the 1950s and 1960s? One could say that the overall trend in inflation over the last century has been down, but that is only technically true. Who is to say that our current low-inflation environment is simply a matter of historical luck, and that soaring inflation is right around the corner? That argument would be just as legitimate as Zakaria’s, based on the data.
Zakaria’s third and final point is the following:
And the third force that has underpinned the resilience of the global system is technological connectivity. Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. Today the information revolution has created a much more deeply connected global system… This diffusion of knowledge may actually be the most important reason for the stability of the current system. The majority of the world’s nations have learned some basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results.
The first part of this one is simply incorrect. Technological globalization has been occurring for decades. It was paltry compared to today, of course, but 100 years ago they had the telephone, telegraph and international travel by steamship. The second part relies on the assumption that current neoliberal economic regimes are basically good for developing countries. That is a dubious idea, at best. In addition, he assumes that almost all countries are basically using similar economic regimes. This is manifestly untrue.
The More Things Change…
Yes, in the broadest terms, almost everybody accepts the necessity of property rights, the profit motive, and trade organized by markets. But beyond that, there remain huge differences when it comes to social welfare, the strength of labor unions, government intervention in private industry, state regulation of various sectors, the proper mission of the central bank and currency valuation, just to name a few. Papering over these important differences results in a narrative about as useful as saying “although different countries have different political and economic orders—some communist, some capitalist, some dictatorial, some democratic—everybody agrees on the need for a government.”
Zakaria makes some interesting points, and it is necessary to remember that as bad as things may seem, the total economic system is complex, and we can never know what the future may hold. But it seems that the more salient argument is that fundamental characteristics of the current economic system of countries like the US and the UK—abundant reliance on debt, public fiscal incontinence and mismanagement, excessive deference to consumption over saving and investment, etc—have led and will continue to lead to major problems, unless they are addressed.
